​If you cannot convince them, confuse them. This is the basic for selling lies. And very basic for anonymous SIM card scam.

​There is no way to make a phone call from your cell phone without a SIM card, unless you are calling emergency numbers or you are using app voice calls via WIFI (as Skype or WhatsApp). But because scammers are trying to sell you a SIM that pretend to be "anonymous", that SIM might use a cell tower. Also, even when using data voice calls instead of regular voice calls, your phone will connect to nearest cell tower (data connection channels instead of voice channels). Unless using WIFI, there is no way to circumvent a cell tower if you want to communicate. A cell tower means mobile network, servers, SS7 vulnerabilities and exploits, IMSI Catchers, GSM Interceptors, location tracking and monitoring. Least but not last, mass surveillance.

​Are you a happy buyer of one of those Anonymous SIM cards? Are you sure that IMSI is protected and your SIM security is "hardened"? Well, time has come now for a small and quick test.

Most of people have no idea what IMSI is, and also no idea on how to get it from their own SIM card. Moreover, they have no idea what can be done when someone is getting IMSI from your SIM card. So let's start testing. No need for any technical skills, special knowledge or payments.

​Anonymous SIM card vendors pretend that card security is "hardened" and IMSI is not revealed to interception systems due to some security tricks.
Whether you have a classy Android or swanky iPhone, you can test your new bought "anonymous" SIM card, right now. Just go to Google Play or App Store and install any app that shows your SIM card info. Example: Whats My IMSI.
On iPhone is even simple: go to Settings menu and from there you pick "Mobile Data". Choose "SIM Applications" and that's pretty much you have to do.

Got your IMSI now? Good. Now you can throw away your "anonymous" SIM. And have a look on your window: your "protected" calls might actually "call" the police straight in front of your gaff.

The IMSI you can see is being used by your phone when connecting to any cell tower, in order to make/receive calls and messages. There is no other way around. The phone cannot connect directly to any "telephone switchboard", as scammers pretend. Because "telephone switchboard" is not a cell tower. Your phone call is routed first trough local mobile network, then trough SS7 network, to recipient mobile network. In this particular case, your phone call is also routed trough your "anonymous" SIM issuer servers located in Russia, before reaching recipient local network. Hence, instead of "hardened" security you've got less security than you have expected. And sure, with an extra payment which will make you think that is serious yet affordable security.

Google for SS7 attack, SIM Toolkit attack, IMSI Catcher to see how IMSI can be retrieved over the air and then what can they do with it.

​Buy cheap pay as you go SIM cards and sell them as anonymous SIM cards, with 500% profit margin.

Straight forward: there are no anonymous SIM cards. This is technically impossible. All of them are just a big time scam that take advantage on lack of knowledge from regular people. And nothing more.

Fact: there is no SIM card without an IMSI.
Fact: there is no connection to a cell tower without IMSI being used for connection purposes.
Fact: even data only SIM cards have an IMSI assigned by the manufacturer.
Fact: there are so called IMSI catchers, designed especially for call/SMS interception based - as its name says - on IMSI.
Fact: if you can call whatever number or you can receive calls, that means your phone is connected to a cell tower, by using voice/data channels.
Fact: once connected to a cell tower, almost ANY cell phone location can be (and it is) tracked by various technologies and systems, taking advantage on mobile network weaknesses or mobile network nodes (SS7).
Fact: once connected to a cell tower, any phone call can be (and it is) intercepted, no matter if voice call is routed on standard voice channels (regular voice call) or on data channels (as Skype, IM, WhatsApp, etc.).
Fact: not the SIM card is choosing the cell tower to connect on it, but the phone. This is the way that all mobile networks are designed (no matter if 2G, 3G, 4G, etc.), a SIM card being only used to identify a certain subscriber.
Fact: the phone number is not stored on the SIM card. Phone number is stored on mobile network servers (HLR/VLR) and cannot be altered/changed directly from the phone/SIM. A phone number can be altered/changed ONLY by using data connection and 3rd party servers. Some particular "russian SIM cards" are using standard voice channels that still route the call trough some russian server, where in fact take place voice changing, and only then the call is routed to call recipient.
Fact: ANY SIM card is encrypted by default, using comp128 algorithm. There is no other encryption that a SIM card support. This is meant for anti-cloning purposes. Some early comp128 versions has been compromised, old SIM cards (until 2012) being easy to clone.
Fact: ANY regular phone call on ANY mobile network (no matter if 2G, 3G, 4G, etc.) is encrypted by default. Otherwise, anyone with a radio receiver can intercept that call. A SIM card CANNOT ad another layer of encryption on top of existing one, nor additional encryption.
Fact: ANY SIM card is trackable and any phone calls and SMSs done with a SIM card can be intercepted.
Fact: IMSI is not the same with phone number, nor with ICCID. IMSI is stored on SIM, since phone number is stored on carrier servers.
Fact: IMSI is not printed on SIM, but ICCID.
Fact: anyone can figure out its own SIM card IMSI, by using freely available apps (both on Google Play and App Store). If you average Joe can do this, then law enforcement or hackers can do that remotely, over the air.
Fact: IMSI change is possible by sending special requests to SIM issuer (the mobile network that issued that particular SIM). The request cannot be sent directly by the SIM user but by other company, in his name (used for example when porting a phone number). Changing IMSI this way is not a standard procedure, despite the fact that IMSI change is mentioned on GSMA and 3GPP procedures. Fraudulent MVNO companies (mostly russian) are taking advantage on this procedure, enforcing the law because the MNO doesn't care, changing SIMs IMSI based on user direct request.

Started back in 2014, anonymous SIM card scam refers to a few types of SIM cards that are being sold to people without a decent knowledge regarding mobile networks:

1. Pay as you go SIM cards (aka prepay SIM)

Some European countries as well as non European ones still issue pay as you go SIM cards with no need to show any personal ID and with no prior registration. This type of SIMs are considered "anonymous" just because there is no connection between user name and phone number. There are no other "special" features or "security hardened" things, whatever that means. At first sight, using a pay as you go SIM (eventually issued by a foreign carrier) looks as an advantage for SIM user. But stepping down on real life, this is what is happening: when a suspect is using whatever SIM, law enforcement ground teams are using IMSI Catchers and/or GSM Interceptors that collect both SIM IMSI and phone IMEI, for further tracking and monitoring. Hence, doesn't matter if the suspect is using a pay as you go SIM: IMSI catcher has done the job, matching all together: suspect identity, SIM identity (IMSI) and phone identity (IMEI). Simple and effective. A good article regarding this type of anonymous SIM scam can be found here.

2. SIM cards that have so called "multi IMSI" option.

This is nothing unusual, and are not adding any additional security to phone calls or location tracking. Just google it by yourself. Multi IMSI SIM cards are sold worldwide by various carriers as SIM cards for frequent travelers which can have up to 4 different IMSIs, corresponding to 4 different phone numbers. The user can choose which IMSI (phone number) is used at a time, by local low rates policies. Nothing to do with additional security or dynamic IMSI change. This type of "anonymous" SIM cards create a false security feeling just because user can alternatively choose from 4 phone numbers to use. Any multi IMSI SIM card can be tracked and intercepted as any other SIM card.

3. Russian "anonymous" SIM cards.

These are SIMs issued by russian MVNOs, which have assigned 1 or multiple IMSIs (up to 4). To place "anonymous" calls, the phone (along with the SIM) will connect to the closest cell tower, by disclosing both IMSI and IMEI. There is no other way around. IMSI and IMEI have to be used in order to connect to the network. Hence, no anonymity: since IMSI and IMEI are disclosed, a wide range of tracking procedures (SS7, GSM Interceptors) are possible, also call interception and SMS interception are just a kids play. Going further, the call is rooted from local mobile network (which is the first weak link that instantly disclose user identity), to russian MVNO servers, where phone number and voice are eventually changed (if user choose to use voice changing and phone number changing), and then the phone call is finally reaching the recipient number. What this clowns are trying to hide from you by taking advantage on your lack of knowledge regarding GSM network standards and specifications is the call route: instead of standard call route (simplified: cell phone > cell tower > core network HLR/VLR > network switch SS7 > russian MNO > russian MVNO servers > russian MNO > SS7 switch > recipient network HLR/VLR > recipient local cell tower > recipient cell phone), they claim that the call originating from your cell phone does not connect to any surrounding cell tower but to some sort of "telephone switchboard", which obviously is not technically possible. Do not forget that even when using data connection to place a IM call (Skype, WhatsApp, etc.), your phone will connect to THE CELL TOWER, by using the same IDs: IMSI and IMEI. In other words, unless you are using WIFI, any call will go trough nearest cell tower, no matter which SIM you are using. With a lot of nonsense blah blah and using apparently a technical vocabulary just to make you think they are professionals and/or skilled hackers, a vocabulary that in the end of the day will probably convince you by confusing you, scammers succeed to sell SIM cards as "anonymous" SIM cards.

We all know that SS7 network is compromised, but it takes more than a few keystrokes to abuse the SS7 network: it takes expertise, money and more important - SS7 access. But from what we have seen, once attackers have all 3 they are making sophisticated use of SS7, because once you have this ability, you want to exploit it fully. The real problem with these unscrupulous russian MVNOs is the access they have to SS7 nodes based on contracts they have with other international carriers, access that make available for them a wide range of SS7 exploits, including call interception and location tracking.

 * Anomalous, but not malicious traffic. This can be everything from malfunctioning nodes, attempting to send for all subscribers rather than their own, to unusual implementations of legitimate services, to anything else which is not known to be malicious. The skill here is in identifying this and making sense of what is malicious and what isn’t – not always easy to understand.
 * Malicious attacks, up to a medium-level complexity. These are the more well-known location tracking, fraud and information harvesting attacks, and were the main type of attacks that operators encountered when they started to investigate SS7 security in depth. As time has gone on, the perception of ‘simple’ has risen in complexity to cover more and more types of attacks.
 * Malicious attacks, of advanced complexity. This is the type of attack that takes investigation to even identify in the first place, and once identified requires detailed understanding of what the attacker is trying to achieve and how, in order to build consistent defense against it. These are the most advanced type of attacks they will increase in complexity as time goes on.

We are actually seeing a progression over time (i.e. over the last 2 years), where some of the attackers who have access to the SS7 network have progressed to trying to use more and more sophisticated methods to achieve what they want, especially now that a large number of operators have begun to implement defense. Most relevant example: ULIN.

One more thing: as always when something is too nice to be true, you never know who is really hiding behind that servers. You have no means to check that russian MVNOs and its hidden strings that eventually lead to local intelligence services.

4. Writable/Programmable blank SIM cards, widely available on Alibaba and other Chinese web shops, also on eBay and Amazon, at really low prices that comes in bundle with read/wright device and software. This way, you can make your own SIM card, with any IMSI.
This is all you need:
a. A programable blank SIM card
b. SIM card Reader/Writer device
c. Software (usually 128k Milenage algorithm and XOR algorithm, Matching the standards of GSM11.11, GSM11.12, GSM11.14, GSM11.17)
The (big) problem consist in Ki (encryption key) which need to be written on that new SIM. You need to know the Ki key, and there is no way to retrieve this key 99.9% of the time from another SIM card, because it is only known by the operator itself. This is why SIM cloning (comp128 v2, v3, v4) is not successful.
Ki problem can be easily solved by a malicious MVNO, which know the Ki and can program its own blank SIM cards.
Chinese vendors has solved this: SIM factory can program the SIM for you when ordering in bulk, including custom printing as you can see on most "anonymous" SIM cards. See it in action:

​Even if Ki is known, once written, the new "anonymous" SIM card will encounter real security issues that make it more vulnerable than a regular SIM, nulling this way the IMSI change function:
a. does not support GSM 11.14: digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) - specification of the SIM Application Toolkit for the Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment(SIM - ME) interface.
b. does not support GSM 03.48: security mechanisms for SIM Application Toolkit - Stage2 (GSM 03.48 version 8.8.0 Release 1999).
This mean that the SIM card is vulnerable to a wide range of remote SIM Toolkit attacks.
c. comes with STK menu that supports various applications, which can be updated by OTA download. That means you are not in control of your "anonymous" SIM card: various and potential dangerous executables can be downloaded and executed on your SIM, without your consent and acknowledgement.

Just google it. Crowds of scammers using tens of websites, eBay and Amazon accounts are trying to scam you big time with "anonymous" SIM cards. You can even call them, asking more explicit about how anonymous SIMs work. No doubt, you will get as many explanations as scammers are. Every single one will come up with his own evasive explanations, sometimes even hilarious for an advised person. Those are "professional experts" type. The other ones - "honest" seller type - will simply reply that they are only selling those SIMs, and more explanations can be found on manufacturer website.

​Judging only by the number of items sold via eBay and Amazon, there are thousands of fooled people. And their number is still on the rise.

Beside billing, phone number changing is a feature that work. On the other phone you are calling will appear always another phone number that is calling. At first sight, this is a stunning security feature for most of users, which will certainly impress the buyer that can see a live demo of the feature. But:
Phone number changing take place on their servers, so the phone number will be changed only when routed call will arrive on their servers, on its way to called cell phone. The call is leaving your cell phone with the same IMSI and phone number every single time, and changes are done only when your phone call hits the server.
From the point of view of an IMSI Catcher or SS7 attack, NOT the phone number is relevant, but the IMSI. This is why interception systems are called "IMSI Catchers" and not "Phone number catchers".
And yes, your cell phone location can be tracked and your calls can be intercepted as any other ones. From law enforcement point of view, changing phone number have no relevance when it comes to call interception and location tracking just because the phone number is NOT STORED on SIM card. Phone number changing is actually the single feature that can be tested by the user, which will convince any skeptical person to buy a anonymous SIM card.

Find out more

source

​Back in 2014, some Russian white hat hackers have revealed Anonymous SIM card scam. Read below their study and conclusions.

Recently discovered new stealth phones scam on blackstone-security.jimdo.com have some pretty funny "pluses" than other competitor scammers. They claim that the stealth phone they sell have no more that 10 (yes, ten!) "clandestine operational functions", as you can see on the picture above.
There is the same old scam: a cracked and non working firmware installed on wrong cell phones (Samsung G600) that will give you only a cell phone that looks like a stealth phone but with no working functions. Sounds familiar? Sure it does: we have revealed this scam since last year.

This sneaky scammer is trying to mislead buyers by selling the same 7 functions stealth phone firmware installed on Samsung G600 cell phones, by simply inventing some additional functions. The firmware used to make his counterfeit stealth phones is absolutely the same as the one you can download for free from our website, for testing purposes: click here to download 7 functions Samsung G600 firmware.

Lame: copy/paste scammer

What else the lame scammer did? Well, proving that he is a lazy ass, an ignorant when it comes to websites or just a little theft (we think that he is a bit of all), he stole the text and pictures from the x-cellular.com website. Looks familiar? Sure it does: there was another scammer who stole text and pictures from the original manufacturer website, called Sohail Hussain aka Steven Adams (Jd Mobile Unlocking Service, private held company). Click here for more info.
Selling fake stealth phones is something, but stealing from others is something else. But when you put all together this facts, the only conclusion you can get is that the scammer have no idea about how things are done on cellphone interception field and have no idea on how stealth phone works. Buying from this scammer is like buying medicine from a quack and not from a pharmacy.

We had a bit of fun with this copy/paste scammer: seeing that he copied also the "About Us" text from x-cellular.com (including pics) and pretending to have a "background in signal intelligence and direct experience of working with GSM, Security phones developers had a significant head start", we have sent him a mail asking simple programming questions, just to make sure he knows at least Java programming language which is also the language used to build the stealth phone firmware. No reply whatsoever, and we'll not expect one by obvious reasons. There are no developers related to this scam. In fact there is no team at all, but only a scammer trying to fool people.

And sure, they claim (actually a text copied from x-cellular.com website) that "the development staff consists of individuals spanning different languages, regions, industries, and nationalities. We are experts in offensive GSM security , cybercrime and security intelligence." Experts...

The scammer is selling also his counterfeit stealth phones on eBay, under the nickname www-kpex-de

And yes, the scammer call all this scams as "Advanced Solutions". No doubt, those are solutions to get some money from ignorant people.

Remember the Anonymous SIM card scam that we have revealed last year? Well, based on the principle "monkey see, monkey do", this scammer is selling sell so called anonymous SIM cards, as the other scammers do. No doubt, there is one thing that scammer knows: how to copy others. And he think that is the business key to success. Or at least to have some pocket money that comes from uninformed or ignorant buyers.

 You can have the complete picture of the scam developed on blackstone-security.jimdo.com when you realize that the webstore has been built on a free platform. (jimdo.com). Why that? Someone who sell security solutions (and not any solutions but "advanced solutions" as he claim) cannot afford a domain name and a decent website when (probably) selling products worth hundreds of euro? Or does he hide his ass under the anonymity offered by a free platform website? Whatever the reasons are, you have to avoid buying from this scammer.
A clear thing, you can not buy security from someone who steal the others hard work, selling cracked/unlicensed firmware and having no idea about how cell phone interception works, pretending to be "a team of skilled programmers".

Realizing that his scam has been revealed, the scammer did the same as the one who ran imeichanger.com, antitap.com and secretgsm.com: has closed down the website located at http://blackstone-security.jimdo.com/
Following our marketing advice, the scammer has bought from jimdo.com his own domain name (antispymob.com), and now he is redirecting the visitors to his new website, called http://www.antispymob.com/   
Apparently the scammer will continue to run his scams on this new website. We will keep you informed about future scam development.

On the scammer eBay account (User ID www-kpex-de) he uses a stolen picture from x-cellular.com website, trying to mislead buyers that the fake phones he sell are enabled with "New updated GUI interface". Despite the fact that he have no idea what GUI means, he is fool enough to use the Xcell logotype on the phone homescreen when selling his fake stealth phones. This is why anyone should ask him before buying about  XCell security seals on the phone backside. Just ask him to send you a photo with the phone backside, along with phone IMEI number. Then you can simply ask XCell guys is that details are genuine or not. Simple as that.

Just to make sure that we're not wrong, we have contacted XCell Technologies, asking if they have any reseller within Germany and The Netherlands. The answer was negative, there is no XCell reseller for these counties. You can do the same, asking about Germany and The Netherlands XCell reseller: you will get the same response.
However, the scammer is trying to hide behind a company called Ennetcom (http://www.detectnu.nl/?page=http%3A//detectnu.home.xs4all.nl/opdrachtform.htm) pretending that the fake stealth phones he sell are manufactured by detectnu.nl.
And here comes the ridiculous lie: how can a company like Ennetcom that sell only BlackBerry secure solutions (and not even the phones itself), a company that is not talking nor offer any dynamic IMEI phones, manufacturing dynamic IMEI phones and sell them only on a eBay account and (until few days ago) on an obscure and dubious web page?! You cannot see any references about dynamic IMEI phones on the Ennetcom (detectnu.nl) web page. Lets be honest: Ennetcom (detectnu.nl) are not at all manufacturers but only a BlackBerry solutions resellers, and nothing else.
No doubt, there is a logical fracture in the scammer thoughts: there is no manufacturer that is not selling his products on his own website, but only other companies products. Make sense to you?

And yes, there is another stupid thing that the scammer is trying to promote: a stealth phone which have the XCell Technologies logotype (the famous X), manufactured by detectnu.nl, a company that in a strange mode, does not say anything about dynamic IMEI stealth phones and actually does not produce anything but only reselling Blackberry secure services. Does it make any sense for you?

As a "very serious" and professional business that "produce" sell a lot of "secure" cell phones, guess what else this scammer is selling to make some pocket money: paintball masks and USB cables. A veritable businessman that is doing businesses on a large scale. Expect a professional customer service and explanations from someone that is selling this king of products? We hope not.

One last thing: a website will never be a manufacturer, as the scammer claim. But only a manufacturing company can produce something. A website is only a marketing platform, a web store.

Trying to dismantle the scam behind antitap.com, imeichanger.com and secretgsm.com, we found out the following facts:

• Behind all this three scam websites hides an italian scammer
• There is no company behind (as trader or manufacturer), but only a guy that buy cheap and sell high, making good money from people
• There is no postal address, no phone number and no contact details, all three websites being a classical online scam
• There is no company PayPal account, but only a personal PayPal account used to sell the fake products.
• There is no "producer" as the scammer states, but only a seller
• There is no customer support since the scammer have no clue about how stealth phones work and how cell interception work
• There are no product user manuals
• There is no general guarantee for any of the products sold on all three websites
• All three websites are owned from the beginning by the same italian scammer. The websites was never owned by any "russian guy"
• On all three websites are being sold counterfeit stealth phones (IMEI change phones) that does not work as described by the scammer
• There are no real anti tapping / anti IMSI catcher / anti interception features on any cell phones that scammer sell, but only words used to fool people, with no factual support
• There are no demo movies to show phones functions and capabilities, being fake products
• The scammer is selling software applications obtained for free from iTunes and Google Play Store. The applications are pre-installed on the phones he sell, pretending to sell "stealth phones"
• The scammer mislead people about real phones capabilities, seriously endangering buyers personal security
• There is no "version 4" Samsung stealth phone, being only a hilarious marketing trick used by the scammer to fool uninformed and naive buyers
  
• The scammer has been caught previously, counterfeiting Samsung G600 IMEI stickers, misleading and fooling buyers about "stealth phones" he sell. More info here
  
• All scammer eBay accounts has been successively closed down due to buyers complaints
  
• This scammer has started his mobile phones scams since 2006
  

More blog entries about the scams on antitap.com, imeichanger.com and gsmsecret.com:

1. Another seller, busted: fake stealth phones for sale 
2. Anonymous SIM card scam
3. A comprehensive view on stealth phones scam                               

Please note that most of the screenshots below has been taken from gsmhosting.com forum and few other websites where the scammer is pretty active.

The amateur scammer behind antitap.com, imeichanger.com and secretgsm.com websites is an italian guy that lives in Monaco, sometimes reported in Swiss. He uses the nickname "cryptone" on most forums since 2008, and sometimes "Luca" only on italian forums.

Early years
In his early years he has started his scams as spy-phone software dealer, on the black market. Back in 2008 he deals the illegal software only on italian forums and websites, taking advantages on italian people that - as you probably know from your trips or interactions - are pretty ignorant when it comes to english language. So, they had to pay a price for that ignorance, buying spy-phone software at high rates. As you know, selling and using spy-phone software is considered to be illegal in most of the countries, even when it comes to spy your own wife or child.

Then in 2008 he has discovered gsmhosting.com forum, starting to post offers for spy-phone software.

Like now, the scammer has used in the past multiple sites for selling illegal software:
nokia-spy.com/index.html
bberryspy.com
spyphonegenerator.weebly.com

In case you weren't already convinced of a certain model of Nokia 1100's can be used for bank fraud by reprogramming the phone in a way that allow the attacker to extract your mobile transaction authentication number -- provided you live in a country like Germany or Holland that use mTANs -- and use it to get into your bank account and transfer funds.

So, this opportunity sounds good enough to the scammer to get involved in it, making some money by fooling people. When he first hear of this scam, posted on gsmgosting.com forum that he want to know more about this scam:

In a short time the scammer realize that he can exploit the market demand for Nokia 1100 by buying cheap Nokia 1100 which are not RH 16-18 series, and counterfeit the software or even the backside IMEI label:

Because he didn't succeed to counterfeit Nokia 1100 RH by software means, he has simply counterfeit the backside IMEI label:

And then he just start selling counterfeit Nokia 1100 on forums, web shops and eBay:

You probably know that the scammer behind antitap.com, imeichanger.com and secretgsm.com is posing now in a security professional, running a bunch of websites and selling high grade security related products pretending that he knows how that products work and how cell phone interception work.
Just to have fun on his approach, vision and knowledge regarding cell phone interception, please have a look below, on how he name an IMSI Catcher or GSM interceptor: "IMEI phishing machine". We think this is self explanatory and need no more proofs about his "professionalism". Do you expect professional customer support when buying and using a stealth phone from this illiterate when it comes to cell phone interception? We hope not.

Then suddenly he have heard somehow about dynamic IMEI phones made by XCell Technologies. He couldn't probably afford to buy one to start replicate it, presuming that he know how to do it (which we doubt). So, he started to ask round for similar but cheaper ones:

Decided to make money from nothing by fooling people, the italian scammer wants to sell even phones that apparently change IMEI (only on phone screen) and not in a real mode. This is yet another proof of the scammer intentions to fool people:

The real story of antitap.com, imeichnger.com and secretgsm.com:

At this stage, from our records comes out that he contacted a Bulgarian hacker and together they put money and bought an XCell dynamic IMEI phone, whose firmware was hacked and extracted by the Bulgarian hacker. The hacker name is Zlatin Penchev from Stara Zagora, and we have his complete story about how he cracked and extracted the XCell firmware and how starting to sell the cracked (and non working) firmware together with the italian scammer. In fact even the italian scammer admits he worked with a Bulgarian hacker:

Obviously, he didn't lose the Bulgarian hacker contact: the hacker has dumped the scammer just because the scammer has no idea about how stealth phones should be replicated and sold to make some pocket money. So, the scammer has started to figure out by himself how to flash the cracked XCell firmware on a phone, in order to clone a real XCell stealth phone. But seems like his attempts to counterfeit XCell stealth phones were unsuccessful at first, because the scammer does not have the necessary knowledge nor quite right tools.

Fake it to make it: please note that the same scammer has been caught in the past using fake G608 IMEI stickers on his fake G600 stealth phones, just to create the appearance of a genuine XCell stealth phone. More about that fake IMEI stickers, here.

Because of using a cracked and non working firmware installed on the wrong platform (Samsung G600 instead of G608), there are a lot of malfunctions and bugs that starts from the moment of flashing (installing) the firmware on the phone:

After his own statements, the italian scammer use the same empirical tool (Onenand downloader) to flash the cracked firmware on the phones, as the other scammer sells on eBay along with the cracked firmware (click here for details). So, no wonder that he got burned out his phones:

Despite the fact that the italian scammer sell counterfeit non working stealth phones, he start advertising on forums about his scam:

He also sell counterfeit stealth phones on his main web shops: antitap.com, imeichanger.com and secretgsm.com.

An interesting fact that demonstrates on antitap.com, imeichanger.com and secretgsm.com are being sold counterfeit non working stealth phones: please have a look on the thread dates: since 2013 the scammer sell stealth phones, but in 2014 he still ask for help in flashing stealth firmware on his counterfeit stealth phones. No need for more proofs, scammer own declarations are more than enough to demonstrate the scam.

Buy cheap, sell high. This seems to be the the guideline followed by the italian scammer. Nothing bad up here, the wrong things and the scam starts when he consider himself nothing but a "legit producer", making confusions between producer and seller. We will not analyze his marketing strategies nor price policy since is not our business. But we will have a look on the products he sell.

Anonymous SIM card scam
We have posted already our conclusions on so called anonymous SIM card, on a previous blog entry. Click here for more details.

Other so called "stealth phones" that he sell
Before talking about other scams, you should know that all Android cell phones that he sell as "stealth phones" are not at all stealth, as scammer claims. The scammer is taking again advantages on unskilled and
unknowledgeable people that have no clue about how cell phone works, how and what a software application can do, selling simple Android phones that the scammer has pre installed several free software applications that can be easily found in abundance on Play Store, by anyone.

Stealth Samsung S4 Duos scam.
What the scammer did? Well, he simply installed on a standard Samsung S4 phone, a free app called Private Text Messaging & Calls. This app can be downloaded and used for free, from Play Store. Click here. Why paying more to a scammer since you can have all this for free, on your Android phone?
What else he did? By using copy/paste, he added some text to his website, copied off the Play Store app page. This is how he launched his product called "Samsung S4 stealth Phone". Pretty easy, right? But not smart enough. We really wonder how many naive people he managed to fool until now.

Please note that the phone does not have ANY anti tapping capabilities nor detection of call interception.

Stealth Samsung S5 scam.
The same scam as above. The scammer has installed the same app (Private Text Messaging & Calls) on a standard Samsung S5. And nothing more. Download for free the app: click here.

Please note that the phone does not have ANY anti tapping capabilities nor detection of call interception.

Encrypted smart phone scam
This is actually a very cheap China made cell phone called DOOGEE TITANS DG150 3.5" (can be bought from here with only 75$) which is not encrypted at all, by default. The phone can be encrypted by the user, as any other Android device, for free.
On this device, the italian scammer has installed the same free app called Private Text Messaging & Calls which can be downloaded from Google Play. Click here.
The scammer is selling this device with 450€, making a good profit on ignorant people.

Please note that the phone does not have ANY anti tapping capabilities nor detection of call interception.

Entry level dual sim burner phone: a scam.
This is actually a cheap NGM feature phone called Stealth, that can be bought with only £91.00 from here. The italian scammer is selling the device with 250€.
Please note that the device will not alert you when your calls and messages are being intercepted. The scammer just sell lies to you.

Please note that the phone does not have ANY anti tapping capabilities nor detection of call interception.

Stealth iPhone 5 scam
Italian scammer is selling ordinary iPhone 5 phones which he installed a free application called CoverMe Private Texting Messenger, which is similar to
Private Text Messaging & Calls, available for Android devices, being released by the same developer - CoverMe Inc.
You can download and install for free CoverMe Private Texting Messenger for iPhone: click here - iTunes link.
No need to pay 650€ for an ordinary iPhone 5.

Please note that the phone does not have ANY anti tapping capabilities nor detection of call interception.

Ultra Tough Anti Tapping Phone: scam
The so called Anti Tapping phone sold by the italian scammer on his websites (antitap.com, imeichanger.com and secretgsm.com) is actually a cheap Android device made in China by OINOM, which can be purchased with only 299$ from Aliexpress.com: click here. Scammer price: 550€.
The scammer has installed on this phones the same free app called Private Text Messaging & Calls which can be downloaded from Google Play. Click here.

Please note that the phone does not have ANY anti tapping capabilities nor detection of call interception.

VHF Stealth Dual SIM Anti Tapping Phone: scam
This so called Anti Tapping phone is actually a China made Android phone called Snopow M8 which can be bought from Aliexpress.com with only 199$: click here.
Scammer price: 390€.
The scammer has installed on this phones the same free app called Private Text Messaging & Calls which can be downloaded from Google Play. Click here.

Please note that the phone does not have ANY anti tapping capabilities nor detection of call interception.

ZOPO anti interception phone ZP1000 Android: scam
This so called "anti interception" phone can be bought for only 172$ from Zopo store: click here.
Scammer price: 399€.
The scammer has installed on this phones the same free app called Private Text Messaging & Calls which can be downloaded from Google Play. Click here.

Please note that the phone does not have ANY anti tapping capabilities nor detection of call interception.

All three examined websites are selling counterfeit and/or non working phones (claimed to be stealth phones), along with free software applications for which the scammer asks for money.
We strongly advise you to keep away from all three websites: antitap.com, imeichanger.com and secretgsm.com. There is nothing that you can buy for your privacy and call security, but only scams and lies.
in case that you been a scam victim on these sites, you might contact us for further assistance.

Our advice: always buy the original. As we did, in the end of the day.

More blog entries about the scams on antitap.com, imeichanger.com and gsmsecret.com:

1. Another seller, busted: fake stealth phones for sale
2. The truth about antitap.com, imeichanger.com and secretgsm.com
   
3. A comprehensive view on stealth phones scam